Interview: Beijing reaction to Hong Kong protests 'tragedy' for city's autonomy

When Michael Hanscom Smith landed the job of U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong, he believed he was going to serve out a straightforward posting in the years before retirement in a politically stable and international city with plenty of good food. But by the time he had boarded his plane to take up that post in July 2019, the city was in the throes of mass popular protests, as local people turned out in their millions to protest the erosion of their promised freedoms. Hanscom Smith had plenty of expertise in the region, having previously served as Consul General in Shanghai, as economic section chief at the American Institute in Taiwan, and on the State Department's China desk in Washington. But he said nobody in Washington, Beijing or Hong Kong foresaw such a mass outpouring of popular anger over plans to allow the extradition of alleged criminal suspects to face trial in mainland China, which he described as emblematic of much wider concerns about the city's promised freedoms. Hanscom Smith, who is now retired, spoke to RFA's Cantonese Service in a recent interview about his experience of the protest movement and the subsequent crackdown under two draconian security laws:

RFA: Where were you working prior to getting posted to Hong Kong?

Smith: From 2017 to 2019, I was in Washington. I was the director of the China desk at the State Department, and I was the acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China and Mongolia. Traditionally, Hong Kong is the comfortable place that people go, perhaps as a reward or before they retire. I assumed it was going to be within the framework that we were all familiar with. 

RFA: How much did you know of what was happening before you arrived?

Smith: I was very familiar with what was happening and of course the situation evolved very quickly and it became quite fluid. I don't think anyone imagined the scope or the vehemence. It took everyone by surprise. It tapped into broader unease about the nature of Hong Kong's relationship with the mainland and the Hong Kong government's accountability. I think that was really ... what became clear to me even before I arrived, and certainly after I arrived, and I started talking to people.

RFA: You don't believe officials anywhere had foreseen such an outcome?

Smith: Everyone was taken by surprise at the scope and vehemence of the protest movement. The Hong Kong government, and, I believe, Beijing [and] also Washington. No one knew that this was going to happen. It became clear that Hong Kongers were very frustrated. And I don't think that you can necessarily paint the protest movement with a single brush. It was not, in my experience, an organized movement with a single leader. It reflected a broad range of concerns that, in my view, revolved primarily around the Hong Kong government's ability to support and preserve the high degree of autonomy that had been promised when Hong Kong returned to the mainland in 1997, and Hong Kongers were very uneasy about the nature of Hong Kong's relationship with the mainland. Given, I think the degree of frankly, shock, that the Hong Kong government was in, and likely Beijing as well, we saw sadly the reaction that occurred after the protests ended in 2020.

RFA: In the form of the 2020 National Security Law?

Smith: Beijing was not expecting that scope of anger and frustration among Hong Kongers and there was a very unfortunate reaction, so first of all, the propaganda, the allegations were that somehow there were "foreign forces" and the United States in particular, somehow, organizing or orchestrating protests as a way to somehow get back at China, mainland China, during a period where there were definitely great tensions in the bilateral relationship between Washington and Beijing. That was the propaganda and the allegation. To me, anyone on the ground certainly would realize that Hong Kongers know their own views very well. This was an organic protest based on frustration and dissatisfaction with local political conditions. It's an interesting question, the extent to which Beijing believed its [own] propaganda that in fact the protests were orchestrated by the United States. I believe that there are probably some senior people in Beijing who do believe that, and acted accordingly, because you've seen this since 2020, this rhetorical obsession with national security and this idea of instilling "stability" in Hong Kong, and an emphasis on "patriots governing Hong Kong." I think there are probably other people certainly in Hong Kong and on the mainland who understand the true nature of what was happening in Hong Kong. To me, this was primarily a protest movement. And I'm talking about hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers who protested peacefully in the streets during the spring and summer of 2019. These people wanted accountability. They wanted their own government, the Hong Kong government to listen, they wanted accountability. They wanted transparency. They wanted the high degree of autonomy that they were promised. And to me that was the driving force behind the protest movement. There was a ... violent fringe of protesters, and the violence was unacceptable. It was condemned by us, by the United States. And unfortunately, that small minority I think, in the eyes of some began to characterize the protest movement. But looking back, it's important to remember that the vast majority of protesters were peaceful.

RFA: Who is responsible for the way the situation deteriorated -- the protesters, Beijing, or the Hong Kong government?

Smith: If Hong Kong had been allowed to operate according to the terms that were agreed to in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, [that] Hong Kong is part of China but the "one country, two systems" format allows for a high degree of autonomy, and if the Hong Kong government had been able to show the accountability, the responsiveness to addressing public concerns about autonomy and about the preservation of "one country, two systems," I think that would have significantly reduced tensions and lowered the temperature.

I was in Hong Kong in November for the district council elections and by November, the protests had become increasingly violent, and they had also been going on for months and the city was under enormous stress. When the results of the district council elections were announced, showing that in fact ... the opposition or the pro-democracy camp were the big winners. Then all of a sudden, Hong Kong became very quiet for a few days, and to me, that was a reflection of the fact that people just wanted to have their opinions reflected and heard. The system was working. There was an outlet in this case, a political outlet that helped to calm the situation at least temporarily. So to me, right now, people tend to use the shorthand of pro-democracy protests and I had some people who claimed incorrectly that the United States was interested in imposing a US-style democratic system on Hong Kong. That wasn't the case. I think of the protests as primarily driven by a desire for accountability, for an accountable and responsive Hong Kong government.

RFA: So the Hong Kong Government, especially the Chief Executive Carrie Lam, was responsible?

Smith: I think that there is a lot of responsibility to go around. And I think it's unfortunate that the Hong Kong government was not able to respond in a way that de-escalated and reduced the tensions, and that led us into the situation that we have now.

RFA: How would you describe police operations at the time?

Smith: There were certainly concerns about policing and we were very focused on the independent investigation into police activity [Editor's note: the report was eventually quashed by Lam's administration], and we were constantly urging restraints and professional policing and de-escalating the degree of violence. I don't think it's accurate to say that there was rampant police brutality. But there were certainly documented instances of problematic police activity. That was on a case by case basis. Some of those were investigated. I think some of them perhaps were not. Policing became very controversial. It was important to have a process to make certain that there was professional policing and the police were held accountable. And there was an investigative process. We were constantly engaged with the Hong Kong counterparts to advocate on behalf of better policing and a reduction in violence.

RFA: Can you describe the reactions of Hong Kong government officials at the time?

Smith: The Hong Kong government was obviously preoccupied with what was happening within Hong Kong. This was clearly a government under an enormous amount of duress, scrambling to come up with a solution to a situation, that was yes, of its own making. I met Carrie Lam multiple times. I and my team were talking to everyone we could from the chief executive on down ... to stress the importance of maintaining the Hong Kong system, and using the existing framework that had worked not perfectly but very well since 1997 in many ways to resolve the situation. There were also a lot of concerns about policing. So that was a big focus of what we were doing. [But] our primary job is always to ensure the safety and security of American citizens. And so a lot of our engagement was focused on security-related issues as well. We were also extremely upset because the consulate employee and her family were doxxed as part of a mainland propaganda campaign to mistakenly blame the United States for fomenting unrest. So that was something else that was on the agenda.

I won’t try to characterize her reaction. I'll just say that we raised this issue repeatedly with counterparts in Beijing, in Hong Kong and in Washington. And we were very unhappy, not only with what happened, but with the response. Access was sometimes a challenge simply because the government had other priorities. We were very direct and persistent in stressing our priorities. And those included a higher degree of responsiveness within the framework of "one country, two systems," and Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy.

RFA: Do you feel that your concerns, including the United States being blamed for inciting a "color revolution," were addressed?

Smith: It was extremely frustrating -- worse than frustrating. It was unacceptable that there continued to be propaganda from Beijing, including these efforts to implicate a consulate employee and her family simply for doing their jobs. Diplomats meet with everyone. We meet with pro-government and opposition figures and that's part of the job. The Hong Kong government understands that, or should understand that. The same thing with Beijing. And of course, it was very upsetting to be accused of fomenting a color revolution when in fact, U.S. policy toward Hong Kong has always been very consistent in supporting a peaceful, stable Hong Kong in accordance with an international agreement that China and the United Kingdom registered at the United Nations. 

At the time of the handover in 1997, Beijing was looking for American support for this new untested format. And our engagement was very much welcomed. So the United States has always had an important role to play in addition to our very real interest. As I mentioned, tens of thousands of Americans is also a huge and important business. And the framework that everyone agreed to was working quite well. When it didn't work for a variety of internal reasons, the United States could have been in fact a valuable partner in helping to stabilize and resolve the situation. And in fact, and I think it was given the bilateral tensions between Beijing and Washington, in part that was another missed opportunity. And it ended up creating divisions, unfortunately, between Hong Kong and the United States at the official level that sadly, still persists.

RFA: You have been pictured several times meeting with different pro democracy politicians and activists. You have been pictured several times meeting with pro-establishment figures. So would it be correct to say that the U.S. government was deeply involved with the protests?

Smith: No. Of course, not. The United States government, our representatives regularly met with important Hong Kongers to represent American interests and to understand what was happening on the ground. Those included people in the activist camp, also in the government camp, and pro-Beijing camp. This is something that we have always done not just in Hong Kong, but everywhere. And unfortunately, it's more of a reflection of the lack of openness and the insecurity prevailing on the Hong Kong side that a meeting in the course of regular diplomatic engagement is somehow twisted and distorted into implying something that it wasn’t. All of our meetings were handled in the same way regardless of who the counterpart was. I think it's much more of a reflection, a sad reflection on our friends in Beijing.

RFA: What does it reflect about the government in Beijing?

Smith: I've spent a lot of time in mainland China, and I'm very committed to the U.S.-China relationship. I really enjoyed my time living in China. I am very disappointed in the direction that China has moved in many ways in recent years. I first visited mainland China in the 1990s. That was an era of openness and confidence. And you could feel the energy and the excitement. There was a genuine desire for engagement. I think for a variety of primarily internal reasons, we're seeing a China that is less confident in the terms of its engagement with the United States and the outside world. Some of these responses -- for example, trailing a diplomatic official while he or she is conducting a meeting -- frankly, it's just not worthy of anyone. So it was an activity that we protested strongly. And it's not the China that I first knew when I started visiting and living there.

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RFA: How do you feel about the response to the protests, in the form of the 2020 National Security Law and the Article 23 legislation earlier this year?

Smith: This should not be seen as an issue of national security. These people are not a threat. They are Hong Kongers, very courageous Hong Kongers who were simply operating according to the Hong Kong that has been agreed to by Beijing after 1997. So we have to continue to remember them and press for ... the confidence in the rule of law that was always such a cornerstone for Hong Kong’s strength.

RFA: Did Beijing send direct orders to the Hong Kong government regarding the response to the protests?

Smith: I don't know the exact nature [of their interactions]. I am sure it probably varied according to the issue and the person. But what's very clear is that the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020 ensures that Hong Kong no longer enjoys the high degree of autonomy that it was promised in 1997. 

RFA: Were you able to meet with Beijing officials from the Liaison Office in Hong Kong?

Smith: No. We requested meetings with the Central Government’s Liaison Office and they never agreed to meet with us. In the fall of 2019, I traveled to Beijing to meet with the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Those meetings were canceled by the Chinese side when I got to Beijing. I was able to meet with the Foreign Ministry. My main counterpart with the mainland in Hong Kong was the Foreign Ministry office [located in Hong Kong].

RFA: What was contact like with Hong Kong officials after the national security crackdown?

Smith: It really depended on the official. In general, officials who were sanctioned did not want to have contact with us. We would still contact them if there was something that was important to us. There were some people who, if they weren't sanctioned, did not want to engage with us. Other people were happy to continue to meet with us. There are some people who are committed to engagement. And there are other people for whatever reason, whether it's their own personal views or their sense of what is more acceptable with [Beijing] may not be interested in engaging with us. That was my experience when I was there. 

Edited by Luisetta Mudie.